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From:
“SOFT” ENERGY DISSIPATING DESIGN FOR THE SEISMIC STRENGTHENING OF
MASONRY INFILL-FRAME
by Randolph Langenbach
CLICK ON IMAGES TO ENLARGE
PART 1:MASONRY INFILL FRAME BUILDINGS IN EARTHQUAKE AREAS-EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE AND THE BUILDING CODES
On the day following the Loma Prieta Earthquake, a visit to downtown Oakland and San Francisco seemed anticlimactic. Except in places like the San Francisco Marina and the collapsed freeway in West Oakland, the effect of the earthquake on the cities was subtle - a pile of broken glass here, a thin crack in the masonry above, a fragment of broken masonry there. A few walls collapsed, but when compared to the views of Mexico City in 1985 or those of San Francisco in 1906, the damage did not seem the least bit catastrophic, despite the news reports to the contrary. In fact, you could even feel the ironic disappointment in the comments of engineers and researchers who had rushed to study what they had expected would be wide spread devastation.
What has happened during the two years since has changed all of that. While the scene in downtown Oakland on October 18th was unduly quiet and unimpressive, the aftermath of the Loma Prieta earthquake has indeed been catastrophic for the city. It is now time to begin to explore some of the reasons why.
The experience in Oakland is significant in a number of ways:
1. The effect of this earthquake on the bay area were focused on only a few areas where the soil responded to the shaking, one of which included downtown Oakland. 2. In Oakland, the most significant damage was concentrated on the major downtown steel and concrete frame buildings constructed in the early part of the 20th century, instead of those hitherto thought to be far more vulnerable, the unreinforced masonry bearing wall buildings. 3. The economy of the city, especially of the downtown, was not strong enough before the earthquake to provide the reinvestment necessary to repair and strengthen the damaged buildings after the earthquake, or to replace them. Several of the damaged buildings are historic monuments which define the character of downtown Oakland, whose loss would remove a significant part of what historic character the city has.
4. This is the first time that any city in the United States has been subjected, following an earthquake, to the closure of such a large percentage of buildings of frame and infill wall construction. Because of their size and location, the temporary or permanent loss of such a significant number of these buildings has had a major negative impact on the city's economy.
The question of why the City of Oakland suffered this loss is not, however, a simple one. The fact that these buildings were damaged in the earthquake is evident, but the necessity for them to have remained closed for such an extended period is not so obvious. The main issue has surrounded the fact that Oakland adopted an Ordinance which requires these buildings be brought into conformance with a slightly modified version of the 1988 Uniform Building Code, before they can be reoccupied. Owners were prevented by the Ordinance from simply repairing their buildings to pre-earthquake strength. To reoccupy them, a full code upgrade is required as well. As a result of this Ordinance, any structure which has exhibited significant cracking of the masonry has been prevented from being repaired unless it is retrofitted to meet the standards of the 1988 UBC.
THE DAMAGED BUILDING ORDINANCE AND THE EFFECTS OF THE BUILDING CODES ON THE PRESERVATION OF DAMAGED BUILDINGS
The Damaged Buildings Ordinance which Oakland adopted following the earthquake specified that all buildings:
"shall be made to substantially comply with current code. . . if as a result of the earthquake damage, the pre-earthquake lateral capacity of the structure has been reduced by 10% or more. . . "
The city issued guidelines on how to determine the 10% loss of capacity. [i] When the City enacted the Damaged Buildings Repairs Ordinance,[ii] it seemed to most people to be eminently reasonable that these buildings should be upgraded. There have been instances in other earthquakes around the world when buildings, damaged in earlier earthquakes have collapsed. One recent example claimed the largest number of lives in the San Salvador earthquake of 1986.
However, it eventually has become apparent that the UBC is incompatible with the infill wall masonry structural system. Because of the huge costs of bringing these buildings into conformance with this Code, even with the use of the variance which allows a base shear of 75% of code, most of the building owners have balked, and some even have been forced to abandon their property. By forcing a major upgrade at the time of the repair, the City has placed what has turned out to be an insurmountable burden on the owners of these buildings, as the cash flow from the rental income, the capital resources for such major improvements are simply not available. In addition, because of this loss of use the equity on many properties has been wiped out, because the underlying land values cannot support the pre-earthquake values which were based on income. Thus, unable to get loans and without financial assistance from the city, many of the owners of damaged buildings are not in a position where they can repair their structures. As a result of this impasse, few buildings have yet to be repaired.
Of the approximately 30 frame buildings closed because of earthquake damage, by the second anniversary of that event only one has been reopened. [iii] Since the original objective of the Ordinance was to improve the level of public safety, it can be seen that this objective has not been achieved. While the delays may not all be attributable to the Ordinance, there is no question that the Ordinance has played a significant role.
The problems which have emerged with the codes are due to the existence of the masonry in these buildings. In discussing the example of one building, the Woodrow Hotel, one is forced to ask whether masonry deserves the "bad rap" that it is getting in California at this time in history, especially in the case of its use as the infill and cladding on early modern infill frame structures.
FRAME AND INFILL WALL BUILDINGS: AN HISTORIC BUILDING TYPE
Infill frame buildings are not a specialized or unusual building type. Most of the early twentieth century mid-rise building in the central business districts are of this type. With the invention of the "skyscraper" in Chicago during the 1880's, the shift from bearing wall masonry construction to the use of a steel (and, later, concrete) frame meant that the vertical load carrying structure of these larger commercial buildings was shifted from massive bearing walls to a light weight network of steel columns and beams. But despite the folklore to the contrary, this did not mean that all of the masonry ceased to play a significant structural role. For many frame buildings constructed during the first half of the 20th century, the masonry cladding was consciously relied on to stabilize and stiffen the structure against lateral loads.
For taller buildings such as the Woolworth Tower in New York City, the steel frame was braced with either diagonal struts or portal braces (the precursor to the moment frame). For smaller buildings, little of this was necessary if the masonry, which by necessity had to bear upon the frame, was also built up to fill the frame, except for the openings for windows and doors. The view of New York City's Flatiron Building under construction (figure 1), and of 343 Sansome Street in San Francisco under renovation (figure 2), shows how the masonry cladding forms a solid wall bearing on the frame. In recent years, construction practice and codes have changed. The cladding on midrise and highrise buildings is now made structurally independent from the frame, so that it is incapable of being loaded by lateral forces acting on the building. This practice can be seen on many contemporary buildings by the flexible sealant joints which are visible on the facades. This shift in construction practice can also be seen when one compares the frame of an early steel building, when revealed by demolition (figure 3), with that of a new one of the same height under construction. While the new building is most likely much lighter in weight, the older one will usually be found to have the much lighter frame.
Does this lighter frame mean that the older buildings will be more likely to collapse in earthquakes? While it is risky to make blanket statements about future earthquake risk, history has shown that collapse of the frame and infill wall buildings has not been a problem in earthquakes in the United States![iv] Why then is this type of construction perceived to be a potential problem in Oakland?
The answer lies in a combination of reality and public perception. The reality is that because of its greater than 1 second period (unusual for the Bay Area), the earthquake was of a character which focused the most intense shaking on midrise buildings. The perception is that, had the earthquake been the "big one," that is, a magnitude8. 0 on the Hayward or San Andreas Faults, these same buildings may have collapsed. This seemed credible to many, including the engineers involved in the development of city policy, because of the extent of the observed damage which did result from a 7. 1earthquake with its epicenter over 75 miles distant. In addition, for those who were in the buildings at that time of the earthquake, the shaking was particularly frightening. It is this human experience which binds reality together with perceptions. Some who were in the City Hall for example said that they "will never enter that building again. "Because of the rarity and unpredictable nature of earthquakes, the belief that collapse almost happened is something which is very difficult to refute. [v]
This earthquake has taught a major lesson: that people tend to blame the buildings for the trauma of the experience of the earthquake itself. Many were genuinely frightened, which is, of course, a reasonable reaction. The effect of this experience, however, on the making and enforcement of public policy has been profound and lasting, and to my mind, excessive. Once people have come to identify particular buildings as dangerous, it is very hard to change their minds even though the risk may be relatively quite small.
The
damage to be found in frame with
masonry infill buildings in
Oakland was almost completely
limited to cracks in the masonry
infill and cladding. On the
interiors of the building, where
partition walls were frequently
constructed of hollow clay tile
with a plaster finish, cracks were
common. In some cases, individual
hollow clay tile blocks were
sheared off, causing small
sections of the wall to collapse.
It was very rare, however, for
large sections of the interior
hollow clay tile walls to fall, or
for walls literally to tip over
out of plane. The folklore that
terra cotta "explodes"
in earthquakes was not born out. On
the exteriors, the cracks are
still visible in the masonry
cladding on many downtown
buildings. In some cases, pieces
of masonry fell to the sidewalk,
although no one was struck by
falling masonry. Of the masonry
falling off of the buildings, the
most frequent occurrence was the
shearing off of decorative terra
cotta. The
Oakland City Hall (figure
4) had cracks on the interior,
with the most severe damage
limited to the steel frame and
terra cotta clad clock tower. This
multi-story tower swayed on its
base causing the near failure of
some supporting steel beams.
Across the street, the historic
flat-iron shaped Broadway
Building (figure 5) suffered
damage to its exterior skin of
terra cotta when it swayed against
its neighbors, causing it to bend
at the 3rd and 4th story levels
(figure 6). The architect of the
Broadway Building, Llewellyn B.
Dutton, had worked for Danial
Burnham, the designer of Flatiron
Building in New York (figure 1),
now a National Landmark. The
Broadway Building has since been
the subject of a protracted
preservation battle with opposing
sides fighting over the
interpretation of the superficial
engineering data which has been
produced to date. None of the
engineering reports addressed what
may have been the principle cause
of the damage - the pounding. The
solution for this problem is very
different than arguments over the
structural competence of the
building on its own. For
many of the damaged buildings, the
pounding with adjacent structures
appeared to be a principal factor,
yet this is not addressed in any
of the codes. While it is
conceivable that damage to these
buildings would have occurred in
any case, pounding often caused
the greatest life safety risk by
focusing the damage in one area
high up on the building. On one
building the stairway was caused
to collapse, and a large section
of exterior wall was almost
dislodged onto a building below by
pounding. Many
other buildings suffered similar
damage. In two buildings,
including that mentioned above,
the interior stairways were
partially destroyed, posing a
severe risk to the occupants, some
of whom were stranded. Rarely,
however, was there damage be found
to the underlying structural
frames. Columns damaged on two
concrete infill frame buildings
caused by short column shear
failure are believed to be the
only examples of frame damage. In
no case did any building suffer
the collapse of any portion of its
load bearing structure. In
one case, the Oakland Hotel
(figure 7 and 8), so much of one
facade fell that all of the
remaining bricks had to be
removed. This one cladding and
infill failure is notable because
the Hotel Oakland had been
partially strengthened during its
conversion to housing for the
elderly. This provided an anomaly.
The only building to lose large
pieces of its upper story masonry
was the only damaged building
which previously had been
strengthened (although not
fully to code). The building as a
whole did not have to be
evacuated.
[vi] In
discussing the damage on the west
wing of the Oakland Hotel with
Loring Wyllie of Degenkolb
Engineers, the designers of the
retrofit, an interesting fact
emerged. When the hotel was
constructed, the partitions were
all made of hollow clay tile.
During the retrofit, this was all
removed. While the damage to the
facade could be explained by the
fact that the new shear wall in
the damaged wing was narrower than
the one in the other wing, this
did not explain why none of the
other infill frame buildings
lacking any new shear walls were
damaged on the exterior to the
degree that this one was. Perhaps
the lack of the hollow clay tile
partitions holds the clue. Whereas
these partitions would have
contributed to the lateral
resistance of the building, the
new stud and plaster board
partitions could not. Without the
stiff and brittle tile partitions,
the full earthquake force was
shared between the new shear wall
and the exterior brick facade.
Because of its relative lateral
flexibility, the shear wall could
not experience much lateral force
from the earthquake until the
brick infill facade was shaken
almost completely off of the
frame.
[vii] While
this explanation can only be
presented here as an hypothesis,
it does illustrate one of the
principal dilemmas of historic
preservation retrofit design.
Often both architects and
engineers are quick to specify
removal of the hollow clay tile
partitions, especially if they do
not support interior decoration of
historical value. While addressing
the fear that falling pieces may
injure an occupant, such removal
can have consequences to the
performance of the building as a
whole that the engineer may not
have anticipated. While the bare
frame, devoid of its terra cotta
infill, is much easier for an
engineer to analyze, it may be the
post-elastic behavior of redundant
elements in the building, like
that of the terra cotta, which
really determines the safety of
the masonry on the facade, and
thus of the fate of people
standing on the sidewalk below. This
facade failure of a partially
upgraded building poses a dilemma:
Is a more stringent structural
upgrade requirement sufficient to
take the loads off of the masonry
justified, or does the
comparatively low damage found in
all of the other buildings
underscore the need for a greater
understanding and respect for
their original structural
integrity? To neglect the strength
and ductility already inherent in
the infill frame buildings risks
retrofit designs which require
them to be either gutted and
rebuilt at great expense. If this
remains the only alternative, most
historic buildings will be
condemned and torn down in the
name of seismic safety. At
the time of the earthquake, the
Woodrow Hotel (figure 9) was a low
rent single room occupancy (SRO)
hotel with 72 rooms. It is a 7
story steel frame building with
brick infill exterior walls and
timber floors. When constructed in
1912, the Woodrow was an
attractive small hotel similar to
many constructed in San Francisco
and the Bay Area at the time.
While of marginal historic
significance in its own right, the
building is a good example of a
period building type. It
contributes to the architectural
character of its neighborhood,
which has a number of similar
hotels constructed at about the
same period. It is a good subject
of study for the seismic retrofit
of historic buildings, because it
shares many characteristics with
other significant historic
buildings with similar
vulnerability to earthquake damage
throughout the United States and
in other countries as well. Over
the course of the last year and a
half, two engineering designs for
the repair and retrofit of the
Woodrow Hotel have been carried
through to working drawings, a
third alternative has been
proposed, and the building has
been the subject of a lengthy
National Science Foundation
research project. It is not yet
been determined which retrofit
approach will be constructed.
However, what has transpired so
far does provide insight into both
the opportunities for the use of a
significant alternative approach
to seismic retrofit, and the
problems which the pursuit of such
an idea can encounter along the
way. The
Woodrow Hotel was damaged by
cracking of the brick masonry
infill on the rear of the building
(figure 10). The front facades
were undamaged, despite the
existence of much larger windows
than found on the rear (figure
11). At the time of the
earthquake, the building was
occupied. At first, the post
earthquake inspectors said that
occupancy could continue. One week
after the earthquake, a new team
of inspectors "red
tagged" the property and
evacuated the building. For
many of the low income residents,
this meant a move into the street.
In fact, many of the residents
left their belongings behind only
to later find that they had been
stolen and vandalized. Eventually,
while the earthquake had caused
damage which a good mason could
have repaired quickly and
relatively inexpensively, vandals
caused over half a million dollars
of damage to the building and its
contents. Most of the occupants
had thought that the closure was
going to be temporary, as the
damage did not seem severe and all
of the interiors were intact. The
elevator and all of the plumbing
continued to work. Except for the
cracks on the back wall, nothing
appeared to be wrong with the
building. The
Woodrow Hotel was constructed in
1912, the same year as the
impressive new City Hall located
only 3 blocks up the street, the
first high-rise city hall in the
country. Like the City Hall, the
Woodrow is a steel frame building,
but unlike the City Hall, its
floor and partitions are all
constructed of timber. The steel
frame is comparatively light
(figure 3 shows a cross section of
a building of similar construction
to the Woodrow).
[viii] The
only braces are small corner
braces only at the level of the
2nd floor. The rest of the frame
is effectively only pin connected:
the beams rest on riveted seats,
or are connected only at the web. The
exterior walls are brick, 2 wythes
thick. On the street front, the 2
wythes are fully contained within
the steel frame, with a 3rd wythe
forming pilasters around the
columns (figure12). On the rear
facades above the second floor,
only one wythe lies within the
frame, with the other placed
outside the frame to form a
continuous weather surface. This
outer wythe is connected to the
inside wythe with the bond bricks
of the common bond (every 6th
course). At the first floor level
in the rear facades, the masonry
is 3 wythes thick, with two wythes
engaged within the frame (figure
11). An
unusual feature of the
construction of this building is
that between the two wythes of
brick are 1/2" smooth steel
reinforcing bars. These run
vertically between the spandrel
beams, and are placed 2. 5' apart.
They were undoubtedly installed to
resist any tendency for the panels
of brick to fall out in an
earthquake, but this kind of
reinforcing is not commonly found
in other buildings of the period.
These bars may be a result of the
fact that the City Hall, which was
under construction at the same
time, has steel bars in the wall.
[ix] Perhaps
the engineer in 1912, (W. W.
Breite, of San Francisco), was
influenced by what he saw being
done on that much more substantial
and prestigious building nearby. These
reinforcing bars are shown on the
engineer's original drawings which
survive, and their existence has
been confirmed in the field. It is
not known how common this practice
may have been. They do not exist
in the Hotel Touraine, another
nearby brick and steel frame hotel
of the same age which is also
currently under repair and
retrofit. Their discovery in the
Woodrow has precipitated a debate
over their effectiveness. Some
feel that they may create a plane
of weakness in the brick, making
it more prone to in-plane failure.
All agree that they help avoid
out-of-plane collapse of the
infill walls. These bars provide
evidence that engineers
forthrightly addressed the
earthquake problem at the time
that the building was constructed. The
damage to the Woodrow from the
Loma Prieta earthquake was limited
to the rear walls, concentrated at
the 2nd and 3rd floor levels. The
worst area of damage was at the
2nd floor on the narrow rear
facade (figure 12). Approximately
50 bricks fell from one inside
corner of the light well, and
bricks on the three other corners
were loosened from the frame but
did not fall. "X" cracks
with some displacement of the
brick were caused across the
panels of the rear wall at the 2nd
floor level. The first floor wall,
which was constructed of 3 wythes
of brick without openings, was
undamaged. The long rear facade
showed several "X" shear
cracks and some other cracks, but
no brick displacement except at
the rear corner. The front
(street) facades were completely
undamaged. The only evidence of
the earthquake on the interior was
minor cracking of the paint film
and plaster along the edges of the
corridor walls where the walls
meet the ceiling. No other damage
of consequence was found. In
the months following the
earthquake, the owner of the
Woodrow Hotel, Kulbushan Gupta,
engaged a local engineer, Owen
O'Neil, to prepare a design for
the repair of the building.
Because of the enactment of the Repairs
Ordinance, the building first
had to be evaluated as to whether
it had lost over 10% of its
lateral capacity. The method for
arriving at a conclusion as to its
loss of capacity was based on a
set of guidelines developed in
March of 1990 by a consultant to
the City of Oakland, Sigmund
Freeman of the engineering firm of
Wiss, Janney & Elstner. These
Guidelines are based on a variant
of standard static equivalent code
procedures for determining the
base shear on the building and
measuring it against the ultimate
capacities of each element
resisting lateral forces. A table
of allowable stresses, ultimate
strengths, and story drift limits
(stiffness) for steel reinforced
concrete, plaster & lath, and
masonry is included in the
Guidelines. For masonry, the
figure to be used for ultimate
strength is 50 psi for
unreinforced masonry and 75 psi
for masonry infilling a frame. This
document provides no means to
include a value for masonry after
it has cracked. One is directed to
"apply 90% of the base shear.
. . to the post-earthquake
condition of the building.
"For the
"post-earthquake
condition" (ie. the damaged
condition) one is supposed to
create a new mathematical model.
Herein lies the problem. There is
no guidance or figure provided for
the evaluation of the masonry after
it has cracked in the earthquake. It
is assumed that if an element is
cracked, its contribution to the
lateral force resisting system is
nil. The guidelines conclude by
stating that "If the loads on
any element exceed their [sic]
strength, it will be concluded
that the structure has lost more
than 10% of its pre-earthquake
capacity. "In other words,
with the infill masonry buildings,
this means that if the engineer's
model predicted that if an
earthquake force equal to 90% of
the Loma Prieta Earthquake were to
occur and cause previously
uncracked brick panels to crack,
the structure would be subject to
a full upgrade before it could be
used again. It
was determined that the Woodrow
Hotel fit the city's definition of
a building with an over 10% loss
of lateral capacity. It was then
necessary to proceed with a design
for a seismic upgrade which met
the requirements of the Uniform
Building Code. The first design
which was submitted and actually
approved by the city was a design
by Owen O'Neil for the replacement
of 2 wythes of brick over a
substantial portion of all facades
of the building with reinforced
concrete. This design was based on
the precedent set by the retrofit
design for the Emporium Capwell
building, which had at that time
just been completed by EQE
Engineers of San Francisco. This
1920's Beaux Arts building was the
first building to be repaired
following the earthquake. The EQE
retrofit design included the
installation of concrete shear
walls on the exterior of the
building. These new shear walls
covered most of the windows and
ornamental brick and terra cotta
facade. The justification for this
was the need to carry out as much
work as possible on the exterior
of the building so as not to
disturb the store inside. In
the case of the Woodrow the
windows were necessary, which
meant that the new gunite surface
had to extend over most of the
facade in order to gain the
stiffness which the calculations
indicated was necessary. While
this design meant that the rooms
would not be disturbed by the
retrofit, it did mean that, like
the Emporium, the original
architecture of the building would
be altered beyond recognition. The
Woodrow has an attractive, heavily
articulated brick exterior, and
this would have been destroyed. This
first design proved to be
infeasible because it was
predicated on removing 2 wythes of
brick and replacing them with
concrete "gunite" on
what the engineer had thought to
be a 3 wythe thick brick wall.
There would have been no wall left
to gunite against. In addition,
the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) expressed
concern over the loss of any
historic value the building may
have. It
was then decided that an
alternative needed to be explored.
It was at that time that the
author (Randolph Langenbach)
became involved with the project
with Lerner & Nathan,
Architects, under a grant from the
California Preservation
Foundation. We began investigating
the concept of the energy
dissipating design and the
beneficial use of the soft story
as a means of avoiding the
destruction of the facades. At
the same time, the engineer, Owen
O'Neil developed another
conventional proposal using steel
braces on the inside of the
exterior walls. Because of the
overturning forces, the existing
columns were not considered to be
adequate, so these braces were
complete unto themselves set
behind the existing frame of the
building. This frame was
originally designed to be two bays
wide on each side of the building,
but after the city expressed
concern that its flexibility would
still allow the brick to crack,
the design was expanded to 3 bays.
(The City has since agreed to
allow 2 bays. ) This interior
solution was certainly more
respectful of the existing
architecture of the building.
However, with a total of 8 to 12
bays of steel braced frames
running from basement to the roof,
this solution is certainly not
inexpensive (approximately $1. 5
million), and not consistent with
the use of the building for low
income housing without massive
government support.
[x] What
was immediately notable about the
Woodrow Hotel following the
earthquake was the complete lack
of damage to the street front
walls. On these two walls the
windows are larger than in the
rear, leaving very little shear
strength in these walls. One would
expect that the deformations would
have caused some visible damage
around the windows. If the floor
diaphragms had been stiff, the
forces would have been transferred
to the rear walls and the elevator
shaft, but with the flexible
floors which simply rest on the
steel frame, it is likely that the
deformations in the front would
have not been fully coupled with
the rear walls. In that case one
has to look to the front walls
themselves for an explanation as
to why they exhibited no damage. There
are two explanations for this lack
of damage. 1) Since the masonry of
the front walls stops at the
second floor, with open store
fronts below, the resulting
"soft story" would help
to isolate the masonry above from
the earthquake forces. 2) The
large openings above serve to
break the shear walls of masonry
into a spandrel and pier system
capable of larger story drifts
with inelastic flexural movement
of the piers capable of leaving no
visible marks. It is likely that a
combination of both of these
explanations served to reduce the
loads experienced within the plane
of the walls, and also transfer
some of the remaining loads into
the interior of the structure
where the forces were dissipated
in the racking of the timber
floors and walls without much
visible effect. Visco-elastic
dampers are manufactured by 3M
corporation and have been in use
for over 25 years in high-rise
buildings, to provide damping to
resist the vibrations caused by
high winds. They consist of steel
plates coated with a propriatary
glue like material (not unlike the
substance used on Scotch Tape)
which has viscous as well as
elastic behavior when stressed in
shear. The
visco-elastic dampers have never
before been used for seismic
resistance in buildings. In this
proposed installation, instead of
being used to enhance the comfort
level, these dampers are intended
to be used in order to reduce the
transmission of the forces up into
the superstructure of the
building, by utilizing the
"soft story" behavior to
decouple the superstructure from
the ground motion (figure 13 and
14). It
was the comparison of the damage
to the rear walls of this building
with the lack of damage in the
front which led us to the idea of
developing a retrofit scheme based
on flexibility and energy
dissipation rather than on
strength. It was at the time that
this was beginning to be explored
that a chance meeting between the
author and Professor James Kelly
led to the idea of using the 3M
visco-elastic dampers in the
design. The logic of it is simple:
if the street fronts of the
building were protected from
damage during the Loma Prieta
Earthquake by the soft story, we
should try to avoid defeating this
protective feature in any
subsequent earthquake while
overcoming any possibility that
the frame in the front could
become unstable from excessive
sway (known as the P-∆
effect). Prior
to the proposal to use the
dampers, we explored a solution to
the problem by proposing that the
new shear wall which Owen O'Neil
had designed for the street fronts
of the building (scheme #1 above)
be located on the inside corridor
wall instead (steel diagonal
braces could be used instead of
concrete. ) The purpose of moving
it back was two fold: 1) it would
avoid spoiling the architectural
integrity of the facade, and 2) it
would separate the rigid shear
walls from the front brick walls,
coupling them together through the
floor diaphragms. The floors would
serve as an energy dissipating
damper buffering the exterior
brick wall from the ground motion
in much the same way as the
"cross walls" work in
the ABK methodology for bearing
wall buildings. This design was
explored with the assistance of
Nels Roselund, Vice President of
Kariotis and Associates. Although
this design was never completed,
the design with the dampers seems
to hold more promise, offering a
promising solution for buildings
which have flexible wooden
diaphragms above open storefronts. With
the discovery of the existence of
the dampers with their as yet
unexploited potential for use in
earthquake design, the alternative
study shifted away from the shear
wall idea to that of using the
dampers. With the dampers, it
seemed possible to reduce the
effects of the ground motion on
the upper floors of the building
as a whole. The first proposal was
to cut away the ground floor wall
in the rear, and thus break the
rigid coupling of the building to
the ground. This immediately
raised some thorny problems,
including an interesting legal
dilemma: If the design of the
retrofit explicitly required the
building to sway over the property
line, would the owner have to
purchase an easement from the
neighbor? (One must remember that
it would likely sway over the
property line in an earthquake
even without the dampers. ) Of the
several experienced real estate
lawyers contacted, all agreed that
the problem was unprecedented, and
thus without an obvious legal
solution. This
issue seemed uncertain enough to
threaten the viability of the
whole idea. As a result, the
author then proposed that the 1st
floor rear wall be retained, with
the dampers used only to protect
the street front facades. This
solved the legal problem because
the structure would not be
rendered more flexible than it is
already, but it also meant that
the design of the building with
its potentially torsional behavior
would be more complicated. In
addition, the back wall would have
to be repaired and strengthened to
resist the full force of an
earthquake without the help of the
dampers, returning us in part to
the dilemma with the codes
described above. In
terms of engineering performance,
the dampers provide an important
advantage over the use of the
recessed shear wall and the
flexible floor diaphragm scheme
first explored because they are
precisely engineered, and their
dynamic performance is known. This
allows for their easy inclusion in
an analysis of the performance of
the building as a whole. The
dampers introduce a known amount
of damping at the onset of
shaking, without large
deformations within the elastic
range before the plastic behavior
begins. Also, the maximum limit is
set, and the full support of the
steel braces come into play if the
dampers exceed their designed
limit of deformation. Should the
damping material fail to perform
as designed, the braces are still
secure. The only variable is the
amount of damping available within
the designed amount of story
drift. The damper material is not
relied on to hold the braces
together or to prevent further
drift. The
dampers are advantageous because
they introduce a significant
amount of damping within very
small lateral movements. Not only
do they avoid a significant
elastic phase in their
deformation, but the plastic
yielding is fairly constant across
their deformation range. The
dampers are manufactured
specifically for each usage. Their
characteristics, such as the
amount of damping per unit
deformation, and the limits of the
movement allowed, are based on the
engineering analysis of each
installation. (See Appendix, by
James Kelly for the technical
details on the sizing and
performance of the 3M Viscoelastic
Dampers) The
proposal to use the visco-elastic
dampers has raised some difficult
issues which have little to do
with their actual engineering
value. The principal problems fall
within the realms of finance, law,
and city approval. (1) The owner is reluctant to spend the funds necessary to carry out the dynamic analysis and engineering design which dampers would require. In this case, having paid for the two separate designs based on the standard code static equivalent approach, the owner is quite reluctant to pay for having it designed again, without the assurance that the city would approve the project in a expeditious manner. While the saving of a considerable amount of money in construction cost is likely with the damper scheme, this saving was less important in this project because of the government funding of the project with grants and low interest loans. The owner's main objective was to obtain a building permit so that the funding could be obtained and the project proceed. Further design only serves to delay the access to these funds. [xi]
(2) There are several legal impediments to the use of the dampers.
(2a) The first emerged with the issue of the drift over the property line. This was an unprecedented problem, and the several experienced attorneys who examined it could not make a firm determination as to how best to solve it, short of actually purchasing an easement from the neighbors. It was solved in this case by redesigning the project to employ the dampers on only the front two walls. The city accepted the explanation that if it could be established that we were not making the building any less stiff than it was before the earthquake, then the property line issue would not be an obstacle.
In the end, altering the building to suit the dampers is probably not as good an idea as using the dampers to improve the building's existing deformation characteristics. If the building is too stiff to activate the dampers, they are probably not suitable for that application.
(2b) Another legal issue recently has emerged - raised by 3M Company itself. 3M has become concerned that the proposed use of the dampers represents a departure from their previous use over the past 25 years for high-rise building subject to wind vibrations. In that use, the buildings are designed to code and the dampers are installed to aid in the comfort of the occupants.
In the proposed earthquake usage, the dampers are to be used to reduce the computed loads on the superstructure of the building, and thus reduce the strengthening work necessary. In the case of the dampers installed around the whole building, the reduction in forces applied to the 2nd floor and above was about half. As such, 3M is concerned that if an earthquake occurred where any one was injured or killed, they would become the "deep pocket" subject to enormous potential losses in a law suit.
This problem has been raised in particular with a proposal to use the dampers on the Golden Gate Bridge, where the scale of any failure, remote as it may seem, would be catastrophic, even if the dampers had nothing actually to do with any failure which might occur.
(3) Another difficulty is in the approval process. While the Building Department has expressed interest in the damper technology, the approval of a scheme with the dampers is potentially a long and expensive process. The city requires a peer review, and with little guidance from the code on the use of these devices, the selection of peers and the preparation of a scope of work for their services is difficult.
In the long term, these kinds of problems proved surmountable. While reviewing the problems which have emerged in the Woodrow Hotel project, it is important to not lose sight of the objectives in proposing the use of the dampers. The dampers are one solution, but not the only solution based on taking a "soft" approach to the retrofit design for frame and infill wall buildings. Whether they are used as part of the primary minimum strengthening after the legal problems are overcome, or as an added element to reduce the level of property damage, they have the potential of greatly improving the performance of these buildings in an economical and historically sensitive way.
In the end, The principal conceptual hurdle to overcome in the introduction of a soft approach in the retrofit of buildings with masonry is the acceptance of a certain amount of cracking in the masonry during earthquakes. This requires changes not only in the applicable codes, but also major change in the way people, including most engineers,perceive and understand the problem of the effects of earthquakes on buildings.
In fact, by adding dampers into conventionally designed braces, the risk of damage which comes from introducing rigid elements into existing buildings is reduced. The dampers may substantially reduce the forces which could be attracted to the new rigid elements. If damping is provided by elements which are intentionally designed to yield, there is always a danger of their being too weak, and thus not limiting the drift, or too strong, and not yielding at all. Because of the ability to manufacture the dampers to a known drift limit control, the risk of having too weak an element is avoided.
CONCLUSION: GO TO PART 2[i] p4 sect 18-1. 05B [ii] First enacted in October, 1989, and revised in May, 1990. [iii] Statistics provided by Oakland Public Works, Seismic Safety Div. , August, 1991. [iv] It is important to note that infill wall buildings have collapsed in the Mexico City earthquake of 1985, and in other earthquakes. However, there are many important differences between the construction of the Mexico City buildings and that of those found in the United States, which make the comparison inappropriate. [v] In all of my thought on the subject of hazard mitigation, I was unprepared for the psychological impact which the shaking had on the public, including the city policy makers, and the consequential impact which this has had on decisions subsequent to the earthquake. [vi] Of all of the damaged infill frame buildings, the Oakland Hotel may have been the only one with falling debris from the upper stories other than from damage caused by pounding. (The Broadway Building and the Grant Building were both affected by pounding. ) This is important because the risk from pounding is not addressed by code conformance in retrofit design, which can mean that the repairs Ordinance and the proposed SB547 Mitigation Ordinance may not even address the one problem which may be the most significant life safety risk. [vii] The Sheraton Palace Hotel in San Francisco is similar in construction to the Oakland Hotel, and also was damaged in the Loma Prieta Earthquake. While it suffered from extensive cracking in its interior terra cotta partitions, the Palace Hotel did not have bricks fall to the street. Cracks were found on the exterior masonry, but often they revealed underlying rusting of the buried steel columns. [viii] The steel beams running in the direction of the joists are only 6" deep (6"I 12. 5#), supporting the joists, they are 10" deep (10" I 25#) and the columns are 8" square, built up out of 3/8 thick steel plates and angles. (ref: original drawings by W. W. Breite, Engineer) [ix] The original specifications state: "All exterior walls throughout shall be reinforced horizontally at the level of each stone or terra cotta course with 1/4" deformed medium steel bars. . . securely held in position and to the steel columns by bending it completely around the column. . . "The exterior wall reinforcing on the Woodrow Hotel consists of 1/2" smooth steel bars set vertically in the brick collar joint, and fastened through holes in the beams. [x] At the present time (August, 1991) this scheme has been submitted to the Building Department for a permit. It is currently going through plan check. Formal estimates and bids have yet to be carried out for it. The visco-elastic damper scheme has been developed in concept, but has not been pursued further because the owner cannot spend the funds for the engineering required before the project is funded, despite the fact that it promises to save an immense amount in construction costs. [xi] The professional fees for engineering are significantly higher for a dynamic analysis based design, compared to those for a static equivalent design. [xii] In the case of the 1960's bare concrete frame buildings described by Englekirk and Hart, the use of visco-elastic dampers may prove to be ideal in that they can be fabricated to add ductility to the system at very small displacements. If ductility can only be added by yielding of structural members, then considerable damage to the original brittle concrete frame may have occurred before this ductility is effective in damping the earthquake forces.
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